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No. 78-349
UNITED STATES

__..

Cert to CA 3
(Seitz, Staley & Hunter)

v.
HELSTOSKI
No. 78-546
HELSTOSKI

~

Federal/Criminal

Timely per extn

~d~ ...~~

~ U-<.-.4~~~
~~ ~
~~
. -- - . ~ - Cert to CA 3
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&

v.
UNITED STATES
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Hunter) /

~~M ·

Timely per extn

Federal/Civil

These curve-lined petitions raise Speech and Debate Clause

problems. In No. 78-349, the Government seeks review of theCA's ruling
that it may not introduce any evidence containing references to past
legislative acts of Congressman Helstoski. In No. 78-546, Helstoski
contends the CA should have granted him a writ of mandamus directing
the district court to dismiss an indictment charging him with
conspiring to violate the official bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 20l(c) (1)
.

r

and with three substantive violations of that statute.

.

'.

-.

FACT:

I'

At the time of indictment, and at all times

specified therein, Helstoski was a member of the United States
House of Representatives.
four-count indictment.
U.S.C.

§

In June 1976, he was charged in a

Count I charges a violation of 18

371, and alleges that Helstoski conspired to violate

18 U.S.C.

§

201 (c)

(1)

by soliciting and obt::dning bribes from

·---

resident aliens for introducing private immigration bills in
the House.

Four of the sixteen overt acts specified in the

indictment allege Helstoski introduced particular bills in the
House to benefit named individuals.

Counts II-IV charge the

defendant with soliciting and obtaining money from certain
aliens for introducing private legislation on their behalf.
The underlying indictment grew out of eight grand jury
investigations that covered a two-year span and resulted in
several indictments and convictions of persons associated with
Helstoski.
Helstoski voluntarily testified before several of those
grand juries.

----

In his testimony, he described his motives for

introducing the bills, the procedures by which he presented the
bills in the House, and the procedures used by his office in
handling requests for private immi9ration bills.

Helstoski

also voluntarily produced copies of the bills and voluminous
correspondence concerning them.

Prior to his first grand jury

appearance and on each subsequent appearance, Helstoski was
advised of his right not to incriminate himself and of his
right to counsel.

He also was told that he was not under

\
complusion to produce any documents, and that anything he did
produce might be used against him.

It was not until

- 3 -

Helstoski's last appearance before the grand jury in May 1976
~

that he asserted any Speech and Debate Clause immunity, after
the Government had refused to answer his inquiry as to whether
he was a target of the grand jury's probe.

At

non~

of

Belstoski's prior appearances was he ever specifically advised

I

of his Speech and Debate Clause privilege.
After the indictment was filed, Helstoski moved to dismiss
it on the ground that, in charging bribery and conspiracy to
solicit and accept bribes for the performance of particularly
alleged legislative acts, the indictment was facially invalid
under the Speech and Debate Clause.

After the DC denied this

motion, the Government filed a motion in limine seeking a
pretrial ruling on the admissibility of particular items of
evidence, including the expected testimony of various witnesses
and more than 200 documents obtained from the files turned over
by Helstoski.!/

-----

Rather than rule on each item of evidence

offered, the DC held generally that the Speech and Debate
Clause precluded introduction of

~

evidence of a past

--------.:..::..~----------

legislative act of the defendant.

The DC then turned to the

-----·-~------

Government's claim that Helstoski had waived his Speech and
Debate Clause immunity.

Finding it unnecessary to decide the

question of whether an individual legislator could waive the
Speech and Debate Clause privilege, the DC ruled that, if such
a waiver were possible, it was so

1/ Representative samples of the evidence at issue have been
submitted under seal in a special appendix filed with the
Court. Helstoski has filed his own appendix under seal, which
contains an affidavit before the DC that controverts the
Government's contentions as to what the witnesses' testimony
will be.

-

q

-

"only where it has been clearly demonstrated that a
legislator has expressly waived h~s • . . immunity for the
precise purposes for which the Government seeks to use the
evidence of his legislative acts."
And, under that standard, Helstoski had not waived his rights.
The Government then appealed the DC's ruling to the CA
under 18 U.S.C.

§

3731, and Helstoski filed a petition for a

writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling the DC to dismiss
the indictment.

HOLDINGS BELOW:

On appeal Helstoski argued that he was

clearly entitled to a writ of mandamus directing dismissal of
the indictment because it charged him with the performance of
legislative acts, namely, the introduction of the private bills
r-

referred to in the particular counts charged.

As the

indictment thus required proof of the performance of
legislative acts, it infringed the Speech and Debate Clause on
its face.

Alternatively, Helstoski argued that the indictment

was invalid because it was returned by a grand jury that had
heard evidence privileged under the Clause.

Finally, he argued

that the DC had "constructively amended" the indictment in
violation of the Fifth Amendment by prohibiting the Government
from proving what it had alleged in the indictment, i.e., the
performance of legislative acts.
The CA held that, although it had jurisdiction to issue the
writ sought, mandamus was an "extraordinary" remedy that was to
be issued only in "exceptional circumstances" amounting to a
judicial "usurpation of pow.e r."

Kerr v. United States District

Court, 426

u.s.

394, 402 (1976).

Issusance of a writ of

mandamus was, in large measure, "a

ma~ter

of discretion" that

was called for only when the party seeking the writ had no
other remedy and had shown a clear right to the relief sought.
Id. at 403.
The court held that issuance of the writ sought would be
inappropriate in the circumstances of this case.

The

indictment at issue was not materially distinguishable from the
one upheld by this Court in United States v. Brewster, 408

u.s.

501 (1972), and all the Government was required to prove to
support its case was the taking of the bribes alleged, not the
performance of any of the legislative acts mentioned therein.
The indictment, moreover, was valid on its face and had been
returned by a competent grand jury.

That was all that was

necessary to establish the DC's jurisdiction to try the
indictment.
(1956).

Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363

Accordingly, any argument that the Speech and Debate

Clause required dismissal of an indictment returned by a grand
jury that had heard evidence privileged by the Clause was
better left for decision on appeal of a final judgment, for
such an argument did not go to the jurisdiction of the district
court to try the case.

Finally, the DC's evidentiary ruling

did not amount to a "constructive amendment" of the indictment,
for proof of the defendant's performance of a legislative act
was not an essential element of the crimes charged.

The basic

_theory of the offense and facts considered by the grand jury,
~

thus, were unaltered by the DC.'s evidentiary ruling.
•,

'•

The CA then turned to the Government's appeal of the DC's
order precluding the Government from

pr~senting

"evidence of

the performance of a past legislative act • . . derived from
any source and for any purpose."

At the outset the CA rejected

Belstoski's contention that no jurisdiction to hear the
Government's appeal existed under 18

u.s.c.

§

3731 because the

DC had not suppressed or excluded any specific items of
evidence.

That made no difference, said the CA, for the

statute was to be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes
and the practical effect of the DC's order was to suppress much
of the evidence contained in the specific offers of proof made
below, evidence that "otherwise almost certainly would have
[been] introduced at trial."
Turning to the merits, the CA rejected the Government's
alternative arguments (1) that all its evidence was admissible
for the limited purpose of proving the defendant's intent in
taking the bribes: and (2) that at least the correspondence and
conversations of the defendant that were not themselves
legislative acts were admissible to prove the defendant's
purpose in taking the bribes even though such evidence might
contain references to the performance of past legislative acts.
Though the CA agreed that Brewster permitted the Government
to show the defendant's purpose
in taking the bribes, the court
,.....
read Brewster as precl~.?ing the Government from showitfug such
purpose by proving how the defendant had spoken, debated, voted
or acted in the Congress.

Brewster flatly prohibited "any

showing" of legislative acts for any purpose.

See 408

u.s.

at

526-28.

And, the Government could not circumvent this

requirement by introducing corresponderlce and statements that,
•though not legislative acts themselves, contain reference to
past legislative acts."

This would permit the Government to

accomplish indirectly what it was absolutely prohibited from
doing directly.

Finally, the Government's waiver arguments

were unavailing, for they misconstrued the central purpose of
the Speech and Debate Clause.

The Clause was designed to

protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring
the independence of individual legislators.

It was not a

"privilege against non-disclosure" like the attorney-client
privilege: nor was it designed to prevent the use of unreliable
evidence like the rule against use of coerced confessions.
Accordingly, even assuming the privilege could be waived by an
individual legislator, a question the CA found unnecessary to
decide, something more than a "voluntariness" standard of
waiver was required.

In view of the separation-of-powers

principles underlying the Clause, any waiver in the context of
a criminal prosecution "must be express and for the specific
purpose for which the evidence of legislative acts is sought to
be used against the member."

Under that standard, no express

waiver of Helstoski's Speech and Debate Clause privilege could
be found in the mere fact that he had voluntarily testified and
produced documents concerning his legislative acts before the
grand jury.
CONTENTIONS:

The parties essentially reiterate the

arguments raised and rejected in the courts below.

-------------------

~

- ----------------------~--------~~-------

In No. 546, Helskoski claims the indictment is invalid
because it charges the performance of specific legislative acts
privileged under the Speech and Debate Clause, and because it
was returned by a grand jury that had heard evidence privileged
under the Clause.

He also claims the DC's ruling

constructively amended the indictment.

Finally, he claims

issuance of a writ of mandamus is necessary because no other
remedy exist to protect his right under the Speech and Debate
Clause not to put on trial for performing legislative acts.
In response, the Government relies on the CA's reasoning
below, argues that Helskoski has an adequate remedy by way of
appeal, and contends the CA did not abuse its discretion in
denying the writ.
In No. 78-349, the Government again claims that it should
be allowed to introduce evidence concerning correspondence,
conversations and acts occurring outside the legislative
process itself even though such evidence might contain
references to the performance of past legislative acts.

The

Government relies on Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1972), for the view that acts and conversations occuring
outside the halls of Congress are unprotected by the Speech and
Debate Clause.

Furthermore, Brewster itself is inconsistent

with the CA's broad ban on any evidence that simply refers to a
past legislative act, a ruling that the DC has subsequently
interpreted to prohibit even evidence of payments of money to
Helstoski subsequent to any legislative act on the theory that
the jury might infer performance of the legislative act from

-

(

receipt of the money.

9

-~------------------~----------------

If permitted to stand, the CA's ruling

will effectively insulate members of Congress from any bribery
prosecutions.

Finally, the Government contends that the CA

adopted a "waiver" standard that is so strict as to preclude
any waiver of the Speech and Debate Clause privilege, and that
is inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit's ruling in United
States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 780-81 (1976), vacated on other
grounds, 537 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1977), that a state legislator
could waive his Speech and Debate Clause privilege by
voluntarily testifying before a grand jury.
Belstoski answers that the Speech and Debate Clause
protects "acts, not actors," and that the Government is
attempting simply to evade the flat ban on direct or indirect
proof of legislative acts laid down in Brewster and United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966).

Moreover, he observes

that there is dispute between the parties as to what the
testimony of certain witnesses might be.

Accordingly, this

case provides a poor vehicle for resolving the reach of the
Speech and Debate Clause with respect to specific items of
evidence, particularly as the DC refused to rule on the
admissibility of the specific offers of proof made by the
Government.

Finally, Helstoski stresses that he was never

advised that he was a target of the grand jury proceedings.

He

cooperated fully with the grand juries only because he believed
that his aide was the target and that no Speech and Debate
Claus~

immunity existed covering a third-party's crime.

Gravel, supra at 628-29.

Helstoski notes that, after the

See

- 10

_----~--------------------~--

Government refused to answer his inquiry as to whether he was a
target of the grand jury probes, no further cooperation was
forthcoming from him.

Accordingly, it is absurd to suggest, as

the Government does, that he ever knowingly or intelligently
waived his Speech and Debate Clause immunity, even assuming
such a waiver is possible.
ANALYSIS:

I believe that Brewster leaves open at least two

issues presented here, namely, whether and under what

leg ~o~ay waive his Speech and
an~ther the prohibition of proof of

circumstances an individual
Debate Clause immunity,

~

legislative acts forecloses the use of · any evidence that makes
incidental reference to legislative acts or permits an
inference that they have been performed.

Moreover, the

indictment at issue here alleges the performance of legislative
acts with a particularity not present in the indictment in
.

Brewster.

·~

Arguably, the references to the performance of

particular legislative acts alleged in the indictment does not
provide cause to distinguish Brewster, for those references can
be deleted as mere surplusage in that the allegations that
Helstoski actually introduced private bills in the House are
not essential to the prosecution's case under 18

S 201(c} (1}.

u.s.c.

The introduction of the private bills, however,

does appear to be an essential aspect of the conspiracy charged
in count one of the indictment.

And, accordingly, at least

that count seems troubling in light of United States v.
Johnson, 383

u.s.

169, 185 {1966}.

- 11

-~----~~-------------------------

In any event, the issues presented in these petitions seem
sufficiently important and likely to recur as to warrant the
Court's attention, whatever one's views on the merits.

There

is not, however, any clear conflict in the Circuits as to the
issues raised.

Craig, on which the Government relies for its

waiver argument, involved only a state Speech and Debate Clause
question, and the panel's decision was l ater vacated anyways.
There are responses.
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SUMMARY: See preliminary memorandum in No. 78-349, with
which this petition is curve-lined.
There is a response.
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®ffice of tbe ~olicitor ®eneral
Ma:sbington, J;l.~. 20530
March 27, 1979

Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr.
Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543
Re:

United States v. Helstoski, No. 78-349
Helstoski v. Meanor, No. 78-546

Dear Mr. Rodak:
My response to a question asked during the oral argument in this case may have left the impression that the
government has decided to abandon the contentions made in
Part I(B) of the Brief for the United States, pages 7688. The purpose of this letter is to affirm that in all
respects the position of the United States remains that
stated in the government's brief. I regret any confusion
that may have arisen during the oral argument.
Sincerely yours,

~ 7(?J1.~L .... f.

Wade H. McCree, Jr.
Solicitor General

cc:

Morton Stavis, Esq.
744 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Stanley M. Brand, Esq.
General Counsel to the Clerk
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
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Clerk
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543
Re:

United States v. Helstoski, No. 78-349
Helstoski v. Meanor, No. 78-546

Dear Mr. Rodak:
My response to a question asked during the oral argument in this case may have left the impression that the
government has decided to abandon the contentions made in
Part I(B) of the Brief for the United States, pages 7688. The purpose of this letter is to affirm that in all
respects the position of the United States remains that
stated in the government's brief. I regret any confusion
that may have arisen during the oral argument.
Sincerely yours,
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Wade H. McCree, Jr.
Solicitor General

cc:

Morton Stavis, Esq.
744 Broad Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Stanley M. Brand, Esq.
General Counsel to the Clerk
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
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CHAM!IERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 28, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Re:

78-349
78-546

U.S. v. Helstoski
Helstoski v. Meanor

I was not surprised to receive the enclosed
memorandum today from the Solicitor General.
When
he responded on this point, I thought it was one of
those things that happen when four or five "inquisitors"
are at you.
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U.S. v. Helstoski
Heistoski v. Meanor

I was not surprised to receive the enclosed
memorandum today from the Solicitor General. When
he responded on this point, I thought it was one of
those things that happen when four or five "inquisitors"
are at you.
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Justice White
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Jlr. Justice Powell
!(r. Justice Reh'1.quist
l(r. Justice Stevens

lromt The Chief Justice
r
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

I

No. 78-546
Henry Helstoski, Petitioner,

On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
H. Curtis Meanor, United States
of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.
District Judge, et al.

v.

[June -, 1979]
MR. CHtEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opmwn of the
Court.
The question in this case is whether mandamus is an appro~
priate means of challenging the validity of an indictment of a
Member of Congress on the ground that it violates the Speech
or Debate Clause of the Constitution. 1 The Court of Appeals
declined to issue the writ. We affirm.

I
Petitioner Helstoski served in the United States Congress
from 1965 through 1976 as a Representative from New Jersey,
In 1974 the Department of Justice began investigating re,..
ported political corruption, including allegations that aliens
had paid money for the introduction and processing of private
bills which would suspend the application of the immigration
laws so as to allow them to remain in this country.
1 The Speech or Debate Clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate
in either House, they [the Senators and RepresentativesJ shall not be questioned in any other Place." Art. I, § 6.
This case wa~ argued in tandem with No. 78-349, United States v.
H elstoski, which concerns the restrictions the Speech or Debate Clause
places on the admissibility of evidence at a trial on charges that a former
Member of the House accepted money in return for promising to introduce
and introducing private bills.

.-

78-546-0PINION
2

HELSTOSKI v. MEANOR

In June 1976, a grand jury returned a 12-count indictment
charging Helstoski and others with various criminal acts.
Only the first four counts are involved in this case. The first
count charged that Helstoski and others had conspired to
violate 18 U. S. C. § 201 (c) ( 1) by accepting money in return
for Helstoski's "being influenced in the performance of official
acts, to wit: the introduction of private bills in the United
States House of Representatives."' The charge recited 16
overt acts, four of which referred to the actual introduction of
private bills; a fifth referred to an agreement to introduce a
private bill. The entire conspiracy was charged as a violation
of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S. C. § 371.,
Counts I~ , III, and IV were substantive counts charging
violations o~ 18 U.S. C. §§ 201 (c) (1) and (2) :
1
'Whoeyer, being a public official ... directly or indirectly,
corruptJly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts,
receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself
or for ~:~-ny other person or entity, in return for:
" ( 1) being influenced in his performance of any official
act; or
"(2) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or
to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for
the commission of any fraud on the United States;
"Shall be [fined or imprisoned]."

(Emphasis added.)

"Public official" and "official act" are defined in 18 U. S.
§ 201:

C~

" (a) For the purpose of this ~ection:
" 'public official' means Member of Congress . • . ; and
" 'official act' means any decision or action on any ques·
tion, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which
may at any time be pending, or which may by law be
brought before any public official, in his official capacity) .
or in his place of trust or profit.)'

78-546-0PINION
HELSTOSKI v. MEANOR

3

Each count charged that Helstoski, acting through his legislative aide, had solicited money from aliens in return for
"being influenced in the performance of official acts, to wit:
the introduction of private bills in the United States House of
Representatives on behalf of" the aliens. Essentially the
charges against Helstoski parallel those dealt within United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), and United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
Each count also charged that Helstoski, again acting
through his aide, had accepted a bribe, "in return for his being
influenced in the performance of official acts, to wit: the intro.duction of private bills in the United States House of Representatives on behalf of" the aliens. Finally, each count
charged that a private bill had been introduced on a particular
date.
Helstoski neither appeared before nor submitted material to
the particular grand jury that returned the indictment. The
prosecutor provided that grand jury with transcripts of most,
but not all, of the testimony of witnesses, including Helstoski,
before eight other grand juries. 2 The United States Attorney
explained that to avoid any possible prejudice to Helstoski he
had not told the ninth grand jury of Helstoski's invocation of
his privilege under the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, he
sought to avoid any challenge resulting from the fact that the
District Judge had appeared before one grand jury to rule on
Helstoski's claim of that privilege.
Helstoski moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that
the grand jury process had been abused and that the indictment violated the Speech or Debate Cause. He supported his
allegation of abuse of the grand jury by characterizing the
·e ight grand juries as "discovery tools." The effect, he contended, was to permit the prosecutor to select the information
presented to the indicting grand jury and to deprive that
2

The proceedings before the various grand juries are described in

No. 78-349, United States v. Helstoski .
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grand jury of evidence of the demeanor of witnesses, especially
that of Helstoski himself.
District Judge Meanor denied the motion after examining
a transcript of the evidence presented to the indicting grand
jury. He held that there had been no such abuse to justify
invalidating the indictment. He found that most of the
material not submitted to the indicting grand jury "was either
prejudicial to the defendants, or neither inculpating nor
exculpating in nature." He also found that the testimony of
two grand jury witnesses should have been presented to the
indicting grand jury and concluded that Brady v. Maryland,
373 U. S. 83 (1963), required that the Government provide
Helstoski with transcripts of their testimony. Judge Meanor
also held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not require
dismissal.
Approximately three months later, in June 1977, Helstoski
petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to dismiss the indictment.
The Court of Appeals declined to issue the writ of mandamus. 576 F. 2d 511 (CA3 1978). It concluded that the
indictment in this case was indistinguishable from that in
United States v. Brewster, supra, where an indictment was
held not to violate the Speech or Debate Clause even though
it contained references to legislative acts. The Court of Appeals rejected Helstoski's argument that the indictment was
invalid because the grand jury had heard evidence of legislative acts, which he argues was in violation of the Speech or ·
Debate Clause. The court declined · to go behind the indictment holding that it was valid on its face.
In seeking reversal here of the Court of Appeals' holding,
Helstoski argues that the extraordinary remedy of mandamus
is appropriate in this case to protect the constitutional command of separation of powers. He contends that the Speech
or Debate Clause assigns exclusive jurisdiction over all legislative acts to Congress. . The indictment itself, he urges, is a
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violation of that Clause because it represents an impermissible
assertion of jurisdiction over the legislative function by the
grand jury and the federal courts. He challenges the validity
of the indictment on two grounds. First, the indictment itself
refers to legislative acts. Any attempt at restricting the proof
at trial, as approved by the Court of Appeals, will amount
to an amendment of the indictment, thereby violating a Fifth
Amendment right to be tried only on an indictment in precisely the form issued by a grand jury. Second, he contends
the Speech or Debate Clause was violated when the grand jury
was allowed to consider evidence of his legislative acts notwithstanding that such evidence and testimony was presented
by him.
II
Almost a hundred years ago this Court explained, "The
general principle which governs proceedings by mandamus is,
that whatever can be done without the employment of that
extraordinary writ, may not be done with it. It lies only
when there is practically no other remedy." Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604, 617 (1882) (emphasis added) . More recently we summarized certain considerations for determining
whether the writ should issue :
"Among these are that the party seeking issuance of the
writ have no other adequate means to attain the relief
he desires, and that he satisfy 'the burden of showing that
[his] right to issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable." ' Moreover, it is important to remember that issuance of the writ is in large part a matter of discretion
with the court to which the petition is addressed." Kerr
v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)
(citations omitted) .
Helstoski contends that his petition for a writ of mandamus
should not be governed by the rules which we have developed
for assessing mandamus petitions generally. He argues that

.
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the writ is especially appropriate for enforcing the commands
of the Speech or Debate Clause. We agree that the guaran~
tees of that Clause are vitally important to our system of
government and therefore are entitled to be treated by the
courts with the sensitivity that such important values require.
We are unwilling, however, to accept the contention that mandamus is the appropriate vehicle for assuring protection of
the Clause in the circumstances shown here. Helstoski could
readily have secured review of the ruling complained of and all
objectives now sought, by direct appeal to the Court of Ap~
peals from the District Court order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment.
Only recently in Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651
( 1977), we held that "pretrial orders rejecting claims of former
jeopardy . .. constitute 'final decisions' and thus satisfy the
jurisdictional prerequisites of [28 U. S. C.] § 1291." /d., at
662. The reasoning undergirding that holding applies with
particular force here. The language of the Abney opinion is
particularly apt, even though the context was the Double
Jeopardy Clause:
"[T] here can be no doubt that such orders constitute a
complete, formal and, in the trial court, a final rejection
of a criminal defendant's double jeopardy claim. There
are simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is
barred by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee." I d., at
659.
This is equally true for a claim that an indictment violates
the fundamental guarantees of the Speech or Debate Clause.
Once a motion to dismiss is denied there is nothing the Member can do under that Clause in the trial court to prevent the
trial; but it is equally clear an appeal of the District Court
ruling was available.
Second, we noted :
" [T] he very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that
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it is collateral to, and separable from, the principal issue
at the accused's impending criminal trial, i. e., whether
or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged. In
arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment bars his prosecution, the defendant makes no
challenge whatsoever to the merits of the cha.rge against
him. Nor does he seek suppression of evidence which the
Government plans to use in obtaining a conviction.
Rather, he is contesting the very authority of the Government to hale him into court to face trial on the
charge against him." 3 Ibid. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.)
Abney concludes:
"[T]he rights conferred on a criminal accused by the Double Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if
appellate review of double jeopardy claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence. . . . [T]his
Court has long recognized that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects an individual against more than being
subjected to double punishments. It is a guarantee
against being twice put to trial for the same offense.''
Id., at 660-661.

That characterization of the purpose of the Double Jeopardy
Clause echoed this Court's statement in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 (1967), that the Speech or Debate·
Clause was designed to protect Congressmen "not only from
the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves."
Here the holding of Abney becomes highly relevant; by
analogy, if a Member "is to avoid exposure to [being questioned for acts done in either House] and thereby enjoy the
8 It is true that Helstoski challenges the admissibility of evidence at his
trial; that challenge, however, is rai:;ed only if the indictment is allowed to•
stand.

18-546-0PINION

8

HELSTOSKI v. MEANOR

full protection of the Clause, his ... challenge to the indict,.
ment must be reviewable before ... exposure [to trial] occurs."
Abney, supra, at 662.
Helstoski argues that he should not be penalized for failing
to predict our decision in Abney. But he cannot be viewed
as being penalizeq since the controlling law of the Third Cir..
cuit was announced at the time of the District Court orde:r
denying dismissal of the indictment, and our holding did no
more than affirm the correctness of the law of th~:~-t Circuit. See
United States v. DiSilvio, 520 F. 2d 247, 248 n. 2a, cert. denied,
423 U. S. 1015 (1975). Cf. United States ·v. Venable, 585 F.
2d 71, 74-75 (CA3 1978); United States v. Inmon, 568 F. 2d
326, 329 (CA3 1977) (referring to the "Abney-DiSilvio rule").
We hold that if Helstoski wished to challenge the District
Court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, direct
appeal to the 'C ourt of Appeals was the proper course under
DeSilvio, supra. 4
Affirmed.

MR. JusTICE PowELL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

4 If the petition for a writ of mandamus were treated as an appeal it
would, of course, have been jurisdictionally out of time. Fed. Rule App.
Proc. 4.
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We granted certiorari in this case to resolve important questions concerning the restrictions the Speech or Debate Clause 1
places on the admissibility of evidence at a trial on charge$
that a former Member of the House had. while a Member, accepted money in return for promising to introduce and introducing private bills.2

I
Respondent Helstoski is a former Member of the United
States House of Representative from New Jersey. In 1974,
while Helstoski was a Member of the House, the Department
of Justice began investigating reported political corruption,
including allegations that aliens had paid money for the introduction of private bills which would suspend the application of the immigration laws so as to allow them to remain
in this country.
1

The Speech or Debate Clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate
in eithrr House, they [the Senator:-; and Representative~] shall not be
queRtionrd in any othrr Place" Artirlr 1, § 6.
2 Th1~ rase wn~ argurcl in landrm with No. 78-546, Helstoski v. Meanor,
which involve~ 1hr qu~f ion of whet her mandamu~ is an appropriate means
of challrnging the validity of an mdict~ent on the ground that it violates
the Speech or Drhate Claw;e of the Constituf JOn.
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The investigation was carried on before nine grand juries.
The grand juries were called according to the regular practice
in the District of New Jersey, which was to have a dift'erent
grand jury sitting on each of six days during the week; on two
days there was a second grand jury. When the United States
Attorney was ready to present evidence he presented it to
whichever grand jury was sitting that day. There was therefore no assurance that any grand jury which voted an indictment would see and hear all of the witnesses or see all of the
documentary evidence. It was contemplated that the grand
jury that was asked to return an indictment would review
transcripts of relevant testimony presented to other grand
juries.
Helstoski appeared voluntarily before grand juries on 10
occasions between April 1974 and May 1976. Each time he
appeared he was told that he had certain constitutional rights.
Difl'erent terms were used by difl'erent attorneys for the
United States, but the following exchange, which occurred at
Helstoski's first appearance before a grand jury, fairly represents the several exchanges :
"Q. You were told at that time [at the office of the
United States attorney earlier]-and just to repeat them
today-before we begin you were told that you did not
have to give any testimony to the Grand Jury or make
any statements to any officer of the United States. You
understand that, do you not?
"A. I come with full and unlimited cooperation.
"Q. I understand that. . . .
"Q. And that you also know that anything that you
may say to any agent of the United States or to this
Grand Jury may later be used in a court of law against
you; you understand that as well?
[Affirmative response given.]
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''A. Whatever is in my possession, in my files, in its
original form, will be turned over. Those files which I
have-some of them are very, very old. I've been in
Congress since 1965. We mentioned this.
" Q. The Grand Jury wants from you simply the records
that are in your possession, whether it be in your office in
East Rutherford, New Jersey, Washington, D. C., your
home, wherever they may be, the Grand Jury would like
you to present those documents. Of course, you understand if you wish not to present those documents you do
not have to and that anything you do present may also,
as I have told you about your personal testimony, may be
used against you later in a court of law?
"A. I understand that. Whatever I have will be
turned over to you with full cooperation of [sic] this
Grand Jury and with yourself, sir.
"A. I understand that. I promise full cooperation
with your office, with the FBI, this Grand Jury.
"Q. The Grand Jury is appreciative of that fact. They
also want to make certain that when you are giving this
cooperation that you understand, as with anyone else
that might be called before a United States Grand Jury,
exactly what their constitutional rights are. And that is
why I have gone through this step by step carefully so
there will be no question and there will be no doubt in
anybody's mind.
"A. As 1 indicated, I come with no request for immunity and you can be assured there won't be any plea
of the Fifth Amendment under any Circumstances."
Helstoski testified as to his practices in introducing private
immigration bills and he produced his files on numerous private bills. Included in the files were correspondence with a
former legislative aide and with individuals for whom bills
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were introduced. He also provided copies of 169 bills intro~
ducecl on behalf of various aliens.
Beginning with his fourth appearance before a grand jury,
in October 1975, Helstoski objected to the burden imposed by
the requests for information. The requests, he claimed, violated his own right of privacy and that of his constituents. In
that appearance he also stated that there were "some serious
Constitutional questions" raised by the failure of the United
States Attorney to return tax records which Helstoski had
voluntarily delivered. He did not, however, assert a privilege
against producing documents until the seventh appearance,
on December 12. 1975. Then he declined to answer questions, complaining that the United States Attorney had stated
to the District Court that the grand jury had concluded that
Helstoski had misapplied campaign funds. He asserted a
general invocation of rights under the Constitution and specifically listed the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
At the uext, and eighth, appearance on December 29, 1975,
he repeated his objections to the conduct of the United States
Attorney. After answering questions about campaign financing, personal loans, and other topics, he declined to answer
questions about the receipt of a sum of money. That action
was based upon his privilege under the Fifth Amendment
11
and on further grounds that to answer that question would
violate my rights under the Constitution."
Because the grand jury considered that Helstoski's invocation of constitutional privileges was too general to be acceptable it adjourned and reconvened before Judge Meanor to
seek a ruling 011 Helstoski's claim of privilege "under the Constitution." After questioning Helstoski, Judge Meanor stated
that the privilege against self-incrimination was the only
privilege available to Helstoski. The judge assisted Helstoski
in wording a statement invoking the privilege that was satisfactory to the grand jury. Thereafter, Helstoski invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege in refusing to answer further
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October 1975, Helstoski complained that he had been served
with a subpoena directing him to appear before a grand jury
on a day that Congress was in session."
At his lOth and final appearance before a grand jury Helstoski invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. But he also referred repeatedly to "other constitutional privileges which
prevail." Nevertheless, he continued to promise to produce
compaign and personal financial records as requested by the
grand jury and directed by the District Judge.

II
In June 1976, a grand jury returned a multiple-count indictment chargiug Helstoski and others with various criminal
acts. Helstoski moved to dismiss the indictment, contending
that the grand jury process had been abused and that the indictment violated the Speech or Debate Clause.
The District Judge denied the motion after examining a
transcript of the evidence presented to the indicting grand
jury. He held that the Speech or Debate Clause did not require dismissal. He also ruled that the Government would
not be allowed to offer evidence of the actual performance
of any legislative acts. That ruling prompted the Government to file a motion requesting that the judge pass on the
admissibility of twenty-three categories of evidence. The
Government urged that a ruling was necessary to avoid the
possibility of a mistrial. Helstoski opposed the motion, arguHe offered this rxplanation to an A::;sistant United States Attorney :
"A. [Helstoski] Do you want to get into the Constitutional question of
whether or not you could serw a member of Congress while Congress is
in session?
"You know very wrll that can't be done ....
5

"Q. Congressman , you've used the term 'illegal subpoena.' Who told
you it was illegal'?
"A. That's my own judgment based on the Constitution and the Rules
of Procedure of the House of Representatives."
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ing that the witnesses would not testify as the Government
indicated in its proffer.
The District Judge declined to rule separately on each of
· the categories. Instead, he ordered that
"the Government may not, during its case-in-chief, introduce evidence, derived from any source and for any purpose, of the past performance of a legislative act by
defendant Henry Helstoski." (Emphasis added.)
The Government filed a timely appeal from the evidentiary
· ruling, relying upon 18 U. S. C. § 3731:
"An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of
appeals from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence . .. not made after the
defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict
or finding on an indictment or information, if the United
States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the
proceeding.
"The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within
thirty days after the decision, judgment or order has been
rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted.
"The provisions of this section shall be liberally
strued to effectuate its purpose."

con~

The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's evidentiary ruling. 576 F. 2d 511 (C'A3 1978). It first concluded that an appeal was proper under ~ 3731, relying
primarily upon its earlier decision in United States v. Beck,
483 F. 2d 203 (CA3 1973). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1132 (1974),
and upon the language in the section mandating that it be
"liberally construed."
Turning to the merits of the Government's appeal, the Court
of Appeals rejected both of the Government's arguments: (a)
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that legislative acts could be introduced to show motive; and
(b) that legislative acts could be introduced because Helstoski
had waived his privilege by testifying before the grand juries.
The court relied upon language in United States v. Brewster,
408 U. S. 501, 527 (1972), prohibiting the introduction of evidence as to how a Congressman acted on, voted on, or resolved
a legislative issue. The court reasoned that to permit evidence of such acts under the guise of showing motive would
negate the protection afforded by the Speech or Debate
Clause.
In holding Helstoski had not waived the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause, the Court of Appeals did not decide
whether the protection could be waived. Rather, it assumed
that a Member of Congress could waive the privilege, but held
that any waiver must be "express and for the specific purpose
for which the evidence of legislative acts is sought to be used
against the membC'r." 576 F. 2d, at 523-524. Any lesser
standard, the court reasoned, would frustrate the purpose of
the ClausC'. Having found on the record before it that no
waiver was shown, it affirmed the District Court's order under
which the Government is prC'cluded from introducing evidence
of past legislative acts in any form.
In seeking review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
the Government contends that the Speech or Debate Clause
does not bar the introduction of all evidence referring to past
legislative acts. It concedes that, absent a waiver, it may
not introduce the bills themselves. But the Government
argues that the Clause does not pl'Ohibit it from introducing
evidence of discussions and correspondence which describe and
refer to legislative acts if the discussions and correspondence
did not occur during the legislative process. The Government contends that it seeks to introduce such evidence to show
Helstoski's motive for taking money, not to show his motive
for introducing the bills. Alternatively, the Government contends that Helstoski waived his protection under the Speech

'.

78-349-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. HELSTOSKI

9

or Debate Clause when he voluntarily presented evidence to
the grand juries. Volunteered evidence, the Government
argues, is admissible at trial regardless of its content.
Finally, the Government argues, by enacting 18 U. S. C.
§ 201, Congress has shared its authority with the Executive
and the Judiciary by express delegation authorizing the indictment and trial of Members who violate that section-in
short an institutional decision to waive the privilege of the
Clause.

III
The Court's holdings in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S.
169 (1966), and United States v. Brewster, supra, leave no
doubt that eviJence of a legislative act of a Member may not
be introduced by the Government in a prosecution under
§ 201. 6 In Johnson there had been extensive questioning of
both Johnson. a former Congressman, and others about a
speech which Johnson had delivered in the House of Representatives and the motive for the speech. The Court's conclusion was unequivocal:
"We see no escape from the conclusion that such an intensive judicial inquiry, made in the course of a prosecu6 We agree with the Court of Appeals that 18 U. S. C. § 3731 authorized
thr Government to appeal the District Court order restricting thr Pvidence that could be used at trial. All of the requisites of § 3731 were
met. There was an order of a district. court excluding evidence; a United
States attorney filed the proper certification; and the appeal was taken
within thirty days. The final clause of § 3731 provides, "The provisions
of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes." In
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975), we concluded that the
purposes of the :;ection were "to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit." See also United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 84-85 (1978); H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 91-1768, p. 21, reprinted in 1970 U. S. Cong. Code &
Admin. News 5842, 5848; S. Rep. No. 91-1296, pp. 2-3 (1970); 116 Cong.
Rec. 35659 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). There are no constitutional barriers to this appeal and we conclude that the appeal was authorized by § 3731.
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tion by the Executive Branch under a general conspiracy
statute, violates the express language of the Constitution
and the policies which underlie it." 383 U. S., at 177.
In Brewster, we explained the holding of Johnson in this
way:
"Johnson thus stands as a unanimous holding that a
Member of Congress may be prosecuted under a criminal
statute provided that the Government's case does not rely
on legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts.
A legislative act has consistently been defined as an act
generally done in Congress in relation to the business
before it. In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits
inquiry only into those things generally said or done in
the House or the Senate in the performance of official
duities and into the motivation for those acts." 408
U. S., at 512.
The Government, however, argues that exclusion of references to past legislative acts will make prosecutions more difficult because such references are essential to show the motive
for taking money. In addition, the Government argues that
the exclusion of references to past acts is not logically consistent. In its view, if jurors are told of promises to perform
legislative acts they will infer that the acts were performed,
thereby calling the acts themselves into question.
We do not accept the Government's arguments; without
doubt the exclusion of such evidence will make prosecutions
more difficult. The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Executive to prosecute a Member of either House for legislative acts. The
Clause protects "against inquiry into acts that occur in the
regular course of the legislative process and into the motivation for those acts." Brewster, supra, at 525. It "precludes
any showing of how [a legislator] acted, voted, or decided."
!d., at 527. Promises to perform an act· in the future by a
Member are not legislative acts. Brewster makes clear that
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the "compact" may be shown without impinging on the
legislative function.
We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that references to past legislative acts of a Member cannot be admitted
without uudermining the values protected by the Clause.
We implied as much in Brewster when we explained, "To
make a prima facie case under [the] indictment, the Government need not show any act of [Brewster] subsequent to the
corrupt promise for payment, for it is taking the bribe, not
performance of the illicit compact, that is a criminal act."
!d., at 526 (emphasis altered). A similar inference is appropriate from Johnson where we held that the Clause was violated by questions about motive addressed to others than
Johnson himself. That holding would have been unnecessary
if the Clause did not afford protection beyond legislative acts
themselves.
The Government argues that the prohibition of the introduction of evidence should not apply in this case because the
protections of the Clause have been waived. The Government suggests two sources of waiver, (a) Helstoski's conduct
and utterances, and (b) the enactment of § 201 by Congress.
The Government argues that Helstoski waived the protection
of the Clause by testifying before the grand juries and voluntarily producing documentary evidence of legislative acts.
The Government contends that Helstoski's conduct is sufficient to meet whatever standard is required for a waiver of
that protection. We cannot agree.
Like the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we perceive no reason to decide whether an individual Member may
waive the Speech or Debate Clause's protection against being
prosecuted for a legislative act. Assuming that is possible,
we hold that waiver can be found only after explicit and unequivocal renunciation ·of the protection. The ordinary rules
for determining the appropriate standard of waiver do not
apply in this setting. Compare Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S.
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458, 464 (1938) ("intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege") with Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 248-249 ( 1973) (proof of knowledge not
req uirf'd for waivf'r). See also Garner v. United States, 424
u.s. 648, 654 11. 9, 657 (1976).
The Speech or Debate Clause was designed neither to assure fair trials nor to avoid coercion. Rather, its purpose was
to preserve the constitutional structure of separate, coequal,
and independent branches of government. The English and
American history of the privilege suggest that any lesser
standard would risk intrusion by the executive and the judiciary into the sphet·e of protected legislative activities. The
importance of the principle was recognized as early as 1808
in Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27, where the court said that the
purpose of the principle was to secure to every member '~ex
emption from prosecution, for every thing said or clone by
him. as a representative, in the exercise of the functions ·of
that office." (Emphasis added.)
This Court has reiterated the central importance of the
Clause for preventing intrusion by executive and judiciary
into the legislative sphere.
"[I] t is apparent from the history of the clause that the
privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits . .. but rather to prevent intimidation by the
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile
judiciary.
"There is little doubt that the instigation of criminal
charges against critical or disfavored legislators by the
executive in a judicial forum was the chief fear prompting the long struggle for parliamentary privilege in England and, in the context of the American system of separation of powers, is the predominate thrust of the Speech
or Debate Clause." United States v. Johnson, 383 U. S,
169, 180- 181 , 182 (1966).

78-349-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. HELSTOSKI

13

We reaffirmed that principle in Gravel v. United States, 408
U. S. 606, 618 (1972), when we noted that the "fundamental
purpose" of the Clause was to free "the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator."
On the record before us, Helstoski's words and conduct
cannot be seen as an explicit and unequivocal waiver of his
immunity from prosecution for legislative acts-assuming
such a waiver can be made. The exchanges between Helstoski and the various United States Attorneys indeed indicate a
willingness to waive the protection of the Fifth Amendment;
but the Speech or Debate Clause provides a separate, and distinct, protection which calls for at least as clear and unambiguous expression of waiver. No such showing appears
on this record.
The Government also argues that there has been a sort of
institutional waiver by Congress in enacting § 201. According to the Government, § 201 represents collective a decision
to enlist the aiel of the Executive Branch and the courts in the
exercise of Congress' powers under Art. I, § 5, to discipline its
Members. This Court has twice declined to decide whether
a Congressman could, consistent with the Clause, be prosecuted for a legislative act as such, provided the prosecution
were "founded upon a narrowly drawn statute passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate the
conduct of its members." Johnson, supra, at 185. Brewster,
supra, at 529 n. 18. We see no occasion to resolve that important question. We hold only that § 201 does not amount
to a congressional waiver of the protection of the Clause for
individual Members.
Precedent and history suggest important reasons why Congress, as a body, should not be free to strip individual Members of the protection guaranteed by the Clause from being
"questioned" by the executive in the courts. The controversy
over the Alien and Sedition Acts reminds us how one political
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party in control of both the Legislative and the Executive
Branches sought to destroy political opponents in the courts.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted in
Coffin, "the privilege secured . . . is not so much the privilege of the House as an organized body, as of each individual
member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, even
against the declared will of the house." 4 Mass., at 27 (emphasis added). In a similar vein in Brewster we stated:
"The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were
not written into the Constitution simply for the personal
or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect
the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators." 408 U. S., at 507
(emphasis added).
See also id., at 524. We perceive no reason to undertake
consideration of the Clause in terms of separating the Members' rights from the rights of the body.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Congress could constitutionally waive the protection of the Clause for individual Members, such waiver could be shown only by an explicit and
unequivocal expression. There is no evidence of such a
waiver in the language or the legislative history of § 201 or
any of its predecessors. 7
7 Seetion 201 was enacted in 1962.
Pub. L. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119. It
replaced a sect ion that had remained unchanged since it:; original rnactment in 1862. Ch. 180, 12 Stat. 577. See Hev. Stat. § 1781, 18 U.S. C.
§ 205 (1958 ed.). Thr debatrs on the 1862 act reveal no di::;cu::;sion of
the Speech or Debate Privilege. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d
Se.·s., 3260 (1862). As explained in the HouRe Heport accompanying the
1962 act, the purpose of the act was "to render uniform the law describing a bribe and pre::;cribing the intent or purpo::;e which makes it::; transfer
unlawful." H. R. Rep. ~o. 748, 87th Cong., 1st Ses::;., 15 (1961). The
Senate Heport expnnded the rxplanation and said thnt a purpose of the
act wn,.; the "::;ubstitution of a Ringle romprehrn::;ive section of the Criminal
Code for a number of exi:;ting ~tatutrs conrerned with bribery. This consolidafion would make no siguific:ant changr~:; of substance and, more par-
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We conclude that there was neither individual nor institutional waiver and that the evidentiary barriers erected by the
Speech or Debate Clause must stand. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Affirmed.
MR. Jus'ricE PowELL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

ticu!arly, would not r<'~lrict thr broad ~;cope of the present bribrry statutes
as construed by the courts." S. Rep. No. 2213 1 87th Cong., 2d Ses:s., 4
(1962) .
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